

From *Armenian Cilicia*,

Volume 7 in the series *Historic Armenian Cities and Provinces*

edited by Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, 2008),

Chapter 19, pp. 495-538.

❁ 19 ❁

THE POSTWAR CONTEST FOR CILICIA AND THE “MARASH AFFAIR”

Richard G. Hovannisian

On the night of February 10, 1920, the French garrison at Marash withdrew abruptly under the cover of darkness and in the process abandoned more than 20,000 Armenians to insurgents linked with Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Turkish Nationalist movement. The tactic of swift evacuation is not unusual in military history, but in the case of Marash the retreat occurred even after it became known that the Turkish forces and irregular *chete* bands which had besieged the city and wrought havoc in the Armenian quarters for three weeks were themselves preparing to take flight. The French maneuver caused much embarrassment in Paris and evoked a storm of protest in Europe and America, while for the Armenians of Marash, Zeitun, Hajin, Sis, Adana, Tarsus, Aintab, indeed of the entire region of Cilicia, the “Marash Affair” marked the onset of a new round of devastation and the final exodus from their beloved mountains and plains.

Situated on a major trade route at one of the approaches to the Taurus Mountains, Marash (Germanicea) had been an important urban center since ancient times. At the northeastern periphery of Cilicia proper, it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, but even then the traditional Armenian and especially Muslim elites were able to maintain much of their prestige and authority. During the nineteenth century, the Armenians of Marash, like their compatriots the world over, passed through a profound cultural revival. American and European missionaries and educators helped to enhance Armenian self-awareness and prompted the Armenian Apostolic Church to extend further its growing network of parochial schools. Marash itself became a primary missionary center with a highly literate and progressive citizenry. By the turn of the twentieth century,

no less than a third of the city's 30,000 Armenians had become adherents of the Armenian Evangelical Church or the Armenian-rite Catholic Church.¹

It was both ironic and tragic that the Armenian cultural revival was paralleled by increasing oppression in the Ottoman Empire and the entanglement of the European powers in the so-called Eastern Question and the related Armenian Question. European demands for Ottoman reforms to ensure Armenian security but without the resolve to enforce those demands only increased the sultan's suspicion of his Christian subjects and added to their distress. The countless local irregularities that had become a part of Armenian life burgeoned into general and full-scale massacres in 1894-96 and in Cilicia once more in 1909. Yet, as had been their way for centuries past, the Armenian townsmen and villagers began rebuilding as soon as the destructive tide had ebbed. But time was running out for the Armenians. The fateful events of the period from 1915 to 1922 were to stifle the relentless drive to begin anew on their native soil.

The grisly details of the deportations and massacres of 1915 and 1916 need not be recounted here. Marash, too, suffered the agony of many sister cities. The Young Turk (Ittihad ve Terakki) dictators of the Ottoman Empire cleverly diminished any potential resistance to the plan of annihilation by sometimes exempting the Armenian Protestants and Catholics from the general orders for deportation, only to set those groups, too, upon death's road once the Apostolic majority had been marched away. Still, the Armenians of Cilicia were more fortunate than their kinsmen to the north and east where nearly the entire Armenian population was massacred outright or subjected to such torment and deprivation that relatively few arrived at the assigned destinations in the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts. The distance between Cilicia and these wastelands was considerably shorter, and, although many thousands died in a blistering exile, at least half of the deportees from Cilicia still clung to life when the world war ended.

¹ See Grigor H. Galustian, *Marash kam Germanik ev heros Zeytun* [Marash or Germanicea and Heroic Zeitun] (New York: Compatriotic Society of Marash, 1934); Sandukht Gouyoumchian [Kuyumjian], *Vaghemi Marashe ev hayere* [Erstwhile Marash and the Armenians] (Los Angeles: n.p., 1990). See also *Kermanig*, the periodical of the Union of Marash Armenians.

Postwar Deployments

Shortly after the Ottoman capitulation to the Allied Powers in October 1918, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby's inter-Allied expeditionary force, composed primarily of Anglo-Indian battalions, occupied strategic points in Syria and Cilicia pending the regulation of affairs by the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. Of the 6,000 French troops in the Levant at this time, most were Armenians belonging to the Légion d'Orient, the volunteer corps that had been organized at the end of 1916 and had participated in the crucial battle of Arara in Palestine in 1918.² Allenby established the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration to maintain law and order in the lands from which the Turkish armies were required to withdraw. He also dismissed Ottoman civil officials from all but the North Zone, which encompassed Cilicia proper (the Adana *vilayet*) and the so-called Eastern Territories, which extended along the Taurus Mountains to Aintab, Marash, Suruj, and Urfa. Until February 1919, the Legion—renamed the Légion Arménienne—was the main Allied force in the Adana vilayet, even though it was too small to occupy more than a few cities and key transportation junctions. Towns in the Eastern Territories, including Marash, were garrisoned by British detachments, and when the British 19th Infantry Brigade arrived at Adana in February, the local Franco-Armenian contingents also came under the command of General Walter S. Leslie and then his successor, General Arthur Mudge.³

² For documents and materials relating to the formation of the Légion, see France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Guerre 1914-1918, dossiers 890-893, and Ministère d'Etat chargé de la défense nationale. Etat-major de l'Armée de terre. Service historique. Vincennes (cited hereafter as Archives de l'Armée), 16N/3198-3199, 3205-3206; Aram Karamanoukian, *Les étrangers et le service militaire* (Paris, A. Pedone, 1978), pp. 115-25; Paul Du Véou *La passion de la Cilicie, 1919-1922* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1937), pp. 16-18; Dickran H. Boyajian [Tigran H. Poyachian] *Haykakan Legeone* [The Armenian Legion] (Watertown, MA: Baïkar Press, 1965), pp. 116-37.

³ Great Britain, Foreign Office Archives (Public Record Office), FO 371/3657, 1922/4501/4502/7169/13595/16747/33707/512/58; Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 1; Edouard Brémont, "La Cilicie en 1919-1920," *Revue des études arméniennes* 1:3 (1921): 306-10; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 20, 24-36; Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (1918-1919)* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1922), pp. 52-57; Boyajian, *Haykakan Legeone*, pp. 214-15,

In February General Allenby assigned a group of French officers headed by Colonel Edouard Brémond to oversee the administration and enforce the armistice terms in the North Zone. The British had no territorial pretensions in Cilicia, which at the time seemed destined to become a part of an autonomous or independent Armenian state that the Allied victors would presumably create at the Paris Peace Conference. Nor did Allenby object that summer to the dispatch of French reinforcements to Cilicia from Lieutenant Colonel C. Thibault's 412th Infantry Regiment.⁴ He did his utmost, however, to block any French military build-up at Beirut and elsewhere in Greater Syria, which the British were not prepared to hand over so readily.⁵ Moreover, as the British were impatient to decrease their responsibility for caring for the Armenian refugees in the Arab provinces, the military authorities hastened the repatriation of this population, which was spread over a broad area in Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt. Within a few months nearly 150,000 Armenians had been repatriated to Cilicia, including some 20,000 natives of Marash.⁶

It was their misfortune that Armenians were to become enmeshed in the intense postwar Anglo-French rivalries. The secret wartime Anglo-French pacts had marked Syria and Cilicia for direct or indirect French predominance, yet now the British were

221-25; Aram Turabian, *L'éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne* (Paris, 1929), pp. 95-100. For a Turkish assessment, see Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Başımıza gelenler: Yakın bir maziinin hâtraları, Mondrosdan-Mudanyaya, 1918-1922* [The Tribulations We Faced: Memoirs from the Recent Past, from Mudros to Mudanya, 1918-1922] (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939), pp. 58-61.

⁴ Brémond had served in North Africa and as the chief of the French military mission in the Hejaz. He was regarded as having a sound knowledge of the Islamic faith and traditions.

⁵ FO 371/4181, 91243/114816/2117/44A; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (cited hereafter as *British Documents*), 1st series, ed. W.L. Woodward, Rohan Butler et al., vol. 4 (London: H.M.S.O., 1954), pp. 321-23, 327-28.

⁶ Brémond, "La Cilicie en 1919-1920," pp. 311-12; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 22-24, 49-50; Boyajian, *Haykakan Legeone*, pp. 207-11; Misak Keleshian, *Sis-Matian* [Memorial Volume of Sis] (Beirut: Compatriotic Union of Sis, 1949), pp. 595-602. The British Foreign Office noted with mild disapproval and sarcasm that the military authorities were "busily dumping" large numbers of Armenian refugees into Cilicia, "where they will of course be at the charge of the French." See FO 371/4183, 136683/2117/44A.

reluctant to relinquish control, especially as they had conflicting commitments to Emir Faysal (Faisal), who aspired to rule over Greater Syria. The resultant bitter dissension contributed to repeated delays in drafting the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, thus allowing precious time for the emergence and coalescence of the Turkish resistance movement in Anatolia. The flagrant lack of cooperation among the Allies did not escape the sharp gaze of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

The stalemate lasted until September 1919 when a world-wide outcry of concern about the fate of the Armenian survivors in the Caucasus reached the Allied leaders. Under strong pressure to demobilize and cut military expenditures after the war, the British armed forces that had occupied the region between Batum on the Black Sea and Baku on the Caspian Sea since the end of the war were being withdrawn.⁷ Premier Georges Clemenceau now played a strategic card by suggesting that France might be willing to go to the rescue of the beleaguered Caucasian Armenians by sending a military expedition via the Mediterranean ports of Alexandretta and Mersin. His tactic to strengthen the French presence in the Levant under the guise of a highly implausible and impractical plan to deploy an armed force overland some 500 miles to the Caucasus was immediately recognized by seasoned British and American diplomats, but in the absence of any other power willing to assist the Armenians militarily, no one dared to veto the scheme. Thus, on September 15, Prime Minister David Lloyd George begrudgingly conceded to Clemenceau that the French army could assume control in Cilicia and the coastal area of Syria.⁸ One did not have to be clairvoyant to concur in British Foreign Secretary Curzon's prediction that the French would move as far as Mersin and Alexandretta and then "forget all about the [Caucasian] Armenians."⁹ And in fact the idea of an expedition to assist the Armenians was quickly and quietly dropped by all parties concerned—except for the Armenians and

⁷ See Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, 4 vols. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971-1996), vol. 2, pp. 109-39.

⁸ FO 371/3668, 123467/123850/123908/124570/126931/11067/58, FO 371/3659, 122448/123063/131467/512/58; FO 608, 342/6/1/18579/19095; *British Documents*, vol. 1 (1947), pp. 524-25, 569-74, 690-93, 700-01, vol. 4, pp. 340-49, 379-380, 384-85, 727, 730-32, 736-38, 745-48, 756.

⁹ FO 608/78, 342/1/6/18473 enclosure.

their vocal but powerless supporters.

The Transfer of Command

Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch soon announced that a French armed force composed of 32 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, and 14 artillery batteries would relieve the British in Syria and Cilicia.¹⁰ In October, General Henri J.E. Gouraud was named to head the French army in the Levant and was instructed to assume the duties both of senior military officer and of high commissioner of France in Syria and Cilicia.¹¹ Meanwhile, Allenby's staff prepared the timetable for British withdrawal, which was to begin in outlying areas such as Urfa and Marash and progress toward the sea. The lack of sufficient French replacements raised fears that the Armenian repatriates would fall victim to the strengthening Turkish Nationalist movement, but Clemenceau's government gave assurances that the French army would be bolstered sufficiently to safeguard the entire population.

The promised reinforcements did not arrive, however, and in late October the French commander at Adana, Colonel Philipin de Piépape, had to detail small detachments to hold vulnerable positions in the Eastern Territories. Still, these French units and their Armenian auxiliaries were greeted with thanksgiving ceremonies and celebrations by the Armenians of Marash and Aintab. The Eastern Territories thus came under nominal French occupation, with barely 1,000 soldiers, who were scattered from Kilis, Aintab, and Marash to Jerablus, Arab-Bunar, Tell-Abad, Suruj, and Urfa. The formal transfer from British to French command took place on November 4, 1919.¹²

Unlike the departing British battalions, the French had neither

¹⁰ Testis, "L'oeuvre de la France en Syrie," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, series 12, vol. 61 (Feb. 15, 1921): 810; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, p. 39.

¹¹ Archives de l'Armée, 26N/3206, dossier 3; Testis, "L'oeuvre," pp. 808-09; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, p. 39; Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie*, pp. 331-32. See also *British Documents*, vol. 4, pp. 449-50, 464-65.

¹² Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3; Brémont, "La Cilicie," pp. 328-29; De Rémusat, "Cilicie, 1918-1922," *Revue des sciences politiques* 54 (Jan.-March, 1931): 352; Testis, *L'oeuvre*, pp. 826-27; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 45, 47; FO 371/4184, 150929/2117/44A.

airplanes nor armored cars, heavy artillery, automatic weapons, wireless transmitters or rapid courier service. Even when components of the 156th Infantry Division disembarked at Mersin and Alexandretta in the following weeks, nearly all of the heavy equipment was kept at Beirut by General Gouraud in case of necessary action against Emir Faysal. The appeals of the military commanders in Cilicia for airplanes and heavy arms brought no affirmative response from Gouraud's headquarters.¹³

With all the uncertainties and difficulties caused by the rapid "dumping" of thousands of Armenian refugees in Cilicia, the repatriates themselves were exhilarated and optimistic about the opportunity to reclaim their properties and rebuild their personal lives and their community structures. The many manifestations of Franco-Armenian amity reached an apex with the return from exile in September 1919 of the spiritual leader of the Cilician Armenians, Catholicos Sahag II Khabayan. His tumultuous welcome was accompanied by the euphoric declarations of Mihran Damadian, liaison of the Delegation of Integral Armenia (Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian in Paris), about the insoluble bonds of centuries between the Armenian and French peoples.

On their part, French officers showered praise on the Armenian legionnaires and gave assurances that France and its allies would not forget their obligations to the heroic Armenian nation.¹⁴ In Marash, the Armenian inhabitants welcomed with great relief the arrival of the small French contingents, including a battalion of Armenian legionnaires. Cordial relations were quickly established between the French officers and prominent Armenians, especially members of the distinguished Catholic Kherlakian clan.¹⁵

Three weeks after taking command of the Army of the Levant, General Gouraud conducted his first and only inspection tour of Cilicia. At every stop along the route from Mersin to Tarsus and Adana on December 10, he was cheered by thousands of Chris-

¹³ Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 46-47; Brémond, *La Cilicie*, pp. 330-35.

¹⁴ *Erkir* (Constantinople), Sept. 10, p. 1, Sept. 27, 1919, p. 2, Nov. 25, p. 2, and Dec. 12, pp. 1-2; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, p. 50; Boyajian, *Haykakan Legeone*, pp. 211-12.

¹⁵ Stanley E. Kerr, *The Lions of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief, 1919-1922* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1973), pp. 62, 79, 82-85.

tians waving French and Armenian tricolors. He received courtesy calls from, among others, Catholicos Sahag, Mihran Damadian, and members of the Armenian National Council and visited workshops employing repatriated refugees before returning to Beirut by way of Alexandretta.¹⁶ Elated by his journey, Gouraud reported to Paris that the transfer of commands had been completed smoothly and without incident in spite of the presence of Nationalist bands on the borders of Cilicia. He made it clear, however, that while he would do his best to arrange for the livelihood and security of the Armenians, he would do nothing to encourage their political aspirations. "Il ne faudrait pas que la Cilicie fût transformée en province arménienne."¹⁷ He also suggested that the Légion Arménienne, already cut to less than half strength, be given its original name of Légion d'Orient and be diluted further by the recruitment of two new battalions comprised of all ethno-religious elements inhabiting the region as a way to mitigate Turkish objections to the presence of Armenian contingents in French uniforms.¹⁸

Shifting French Winds

The French occupation of Cilicia coincided with the collapse of the rather compliant Ottoman cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha and the formation of a new government much more sympathetic to Mustafa Kemal. The foreign minister now complained to the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, Jules-Albert De-france, that the occupation, coming at a time when the Turkish people were awaiting the conclusion of peace and the withdrawal of foreign armies, would only prolong the state of uncertainty and cause serious unrest throughout the country, while the minister of war, a scarcely-disguised Nationalist organizer, called on the French to halt their advance into Aintab, Marash, and Urfa, which had been controlled by the Turkish army until the beginning of

¹⁶ Brémond, *La Cilicie*, p. 335; *Erkir*, Dec. 11, 1919, p. 3, Dec. 17, p. 1, and Dec. 26, p. 2.

¹⁷ Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3, Report, Dec. 15, 1919.

¹⁸ Archives de l'Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, Report, Feb. 12, 1920. In the following months, the French steadily decreased the size of the Armenian Legion through partial demobilization and selective replacement procedures. For Armenian interpretations of this strategy, see, for example, Boyajian, *Haykakan Legeone*, pp. 213-47.

1919, and to end the cruelties of Armenians wearing French uniforms. He warned that continued Armenian excesses would inevitably lead to reprisals against Christians in other areas.¹⁹ Mustafa Kemal himself on November 12 denounced the occupation of Cilicia as evidence that the Allied Powers had not repudiated their annexationist designs and were implementing their schemes without even awaiting the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference. But the Turkish nation, he declared, was united in its resolve to use all moral and material means to protect its honor. Kemal called upon the people of Cilicia to resist the trampling of their rights.²⁰ He had, in fact, already established contact with Muslim notables in Marash and bands of irregulars operating in the Taurus and Amanus mountains.²¹

Although the occupation of Cilicia drew the French and Turkish Nationalists toward armed confrontation, neither side ruled out the possibility of a *modus vivendi*. Colonial circles in France defamed Great Britain as an unscrupulous rival that was not above enticing the French into Cilicia and then posing as a champion of Turkish self-determination in an effort to gain additional political and economic leverage at France's expense. Sharing these sentiments, the French authorities in Constantinople condoned informal contacts with Nationalist sympathizers, even as they officially branded Mustafa Kemal as a military deserter and political adventurer. French intelligence reported that the Nationalists had been completely alienated from the British and were hoping to win French support, but the question of Cilicia was a major impediment. France, rather than acquiescing in a grave error by allowing the region to be included in a projected Armenian state, should consolidate its position there by taking measures to mollify the Turks and to reconcile the Armenians with them.²²

¹⁹ *British Documents*, vol. 4, pp. 506-07; Archives de l'Armée, 20N/158, dossier 3, no. 10.

²⁰ Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927* (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1929), pp. 261-62, 327-28; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Millî mücadele hâtraları* [Memoirs of the National Struggle] (İstanbul: Vatan, 1953), p. 288. See also Brémont, "La Cilicie," p. 337; FO 371/4161, 163686/521/44.

²¹ Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 238-39, 286, 332-33. See also Cebesoy, *Millî mücadele hâtraları*, pp. 255-61, 287-88.

²² Archives de l'Armée, 16N/3206, dossier 3, and 20N/141, dossier 2. See also

The most high-profile contact between the French and the Nationalists in 1919 was a December meeting in Sivas of François Georges-Picot and Mustafa Kemal.²³ It is significant that Georges-Picot was not only a principal in the secret wartime Sykes-Picot agreement for the partition of the Ottoman Empire but also had been the French high commissioner in the Levant until he was replaced by General Gouraud. In fact, the arrival of Gouraud in Beirut seems to have coincided with a shift in the French approach to the Turkish Nationalists.

During their meeting at Kemal's headquarters, Georges-Picot reportedly conjectured on how the situation in the Near East might be affected by a change of government in Paris. In such an eventuality, he suggested, France would make significant concessions to Turkey in exchange for business and investment opportunities, a supervisory role in reorganization of the police and gendarmerie, and certain guarantees for the protection of minorities remaining in the country. Kemal held out no hope for an agreement so long as the French army remained in Cilicia. Turkey might eventually accept the loss of Syria and Iraq, but Cilicia could never be torn from the Turkish heartland. Picot stated that the French-supervised administration in Cilicia was operating efficiently and that his government's obligations to the population could not be disregarded. Yet he also intimated that France might find a formula to restore Turkish suzerainty over Cilicia in return for acceptance of France's "special position" there and guarantees for progressive administrative reforms and minority rights. Kemal replied that the Nationalists had no objection to foreign economic assistance and that competent administrative advice might also be acceptable, but in no way could the territorial and political integrity of the nation be compromised.

20N202, dossier 2, Report of Commander Edgar Pech, Oct. 13, 1919; Berthe-Georges Gaulis, *Le nationalisme turc* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1921), pp. 68-90.

²³ Cebesoy, *Millî mücadele hâtıraları*, pp. 269-70; Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie*, pp. 337-40; De Rémusat, "Cilicie, 1918-1922," p. 353. See also Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974), pp. 183-84; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 66-68; Ruben G. Sahakyan, *Türk-fransıakan haraberutyunnere ev Kilikian, 1919-1921 tt.* [Turkish-French Relations and Cilicia, 1919-1921] (Erevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1970), pp. 74-81.

France would have to relinquish all claims and pretensions to Cilicia and uphold Turkey's right to independence and indivisibility.

The discussions did not lead to a *détente* of any kind, but they had revealed to Mustafa Kemal a certain French flexibility regarding Cilicia and other vital issues. For his part, Georges-Picot returned to Paris as an advocate of an accommodation with the Nationalists which would give France the status of most-favored nation and confirm its special position in Cilicia and its moral responsibility to ensure the protection and rights of Armenians inhabitants there.

The "Marash Affair"

While the French (and Italians) used various avenues to enter into contact with Nationalist intermediaries, even as the Allied leaders were drafting a harsh treaty of peace with the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal prepared to confront the Allies with an attack on their exposed positions in Cilicia. The Turkish insurrection at Marash was to become the first true test of the Nationalist fabric. And the French forfeiture, only three months after General Gouraud's troops had entered the city, was to bring thousands of previously hesitant sympathizers into the Nationalist camp. Whereas the Allied-sanctioned Greek occupation of Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919 gave critical impetus to the Nationalist movement, the "Marash Affair" would provide an enormous boost in morale just at a time when that movement was experiencing widespread pessimism. The Turkish people were now shown that the Allies could be defied and even defeated.

Accurately judging the scattered French detachments in the districts of Marash and Urfa to be the most vulnerable, Kemal had already dispatched officers to organize the tribal units and chete bands and to break open the caches of arms and weapons that had been hidden by the retreating Ottoman army after the armistice. When the French replaced the British in Cilicia proper and especially in the Eastern Territories, they were not prepared for an effective occupation. Aside from inadequate manpower and firepower, the lack of wireless radio equipment and even of carrier pigeons was to have a telling effect on the chain of events. The rugged terrain of the Amanus and Taurus ranges created


numerous hideouts for Turkish and Kurdish partisans, who knew the land well and were able to disrupt telegraph, telephone, and railway service in unprotected stretches. The French faced the added disadvantage of trying to establish themselves at the onset of winter, when the freezing winds and blizzards lashed the troops—most of them Algerians and Senegales—and turned the movement of supplies and the maintenance of communications into major problems.²⁴

Although the French prided themselves on their colonial experience and recruited Muslim gendarmerie units and gained professions of support from many Muslim leaders—especially Alawi, Kurd, and Circassian, they soon made the error of trying to impose the same type of administrative supervision in the Eastern Territories as Colonel Brémond had implemented in the zone around Adana. Regarding such a measure as the first step toward permanent French domination, the Nationalists sent a chete band into Marash to hoist the Turkish flag above the abandoned citadel and to insult and intimidate Muslim officials who were collaborating with the French.²⁵

The approximately 20,000 Armenians who had returned to Marash in 1919 and who constituted a third of the city's inhabitants became deeply apprehensive at this demonstration, understanding full well their own vulnerability in case of conflict. Already, Armenian villagers who had reclaimed their lands near Marash were being harassed and pressured to leave again, and rumors of Nationalist troop concentrations to the north near Shar and Goksun raised the specter of renewed tragedy for the Christian population. The inability of the French officials to respond swiftly and effectively to the first serious challenge to their authority encouraged the Nationalists, frightened Muslim leaders

²⁴ Brémond, "La Cilicie," pp. 327-35; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 75-89. For a study based largely on the French military archives, see Général Du Hays, *Les armées françaises au Levant, 1919-1939*, vol. 2: *Le temps des combats, 1920-1921* (Vincennes: Service historique de l'Armée de terre, 1979).

²⁵ Archives de l'Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, 20N/158, dossier 2, 20N/202, dossier 2. For a Turkish account of the battle for Marash, see Adil Bağdadlılar, *Üzunoluk. İstiklâl harbi'nde Kahramanmaraş* [Uzunoluk: Kahraman Marash in the War of Independence] (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1974). See also FO 371/5043-5044, E1358/E1978/E2310/3/44; Du Hays, *Le temps des combats*, pp. 230-32; Sahakyan, *Türk-fransiakan haraberutyunnere*, pp. 144-48.



Cilicia

who had preached submission and cooperation, and raised questions about the invincibility of the Allies.²⁶ When Captain André, the officer heading the Marash detachment, requested reinforcements to strengthen his hand, the commander at Aintab garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Jean Flye-Sainte-Marie, was indecisive, first summoning André for consultations, then sending him to Adana to report to the commander of the 516th Division, Brigadier General Julien Dufieux.²⁷

By the time Dufieux ordered reinforcements to Marash in early January 1920, the Nationalist bands had taken the initiative, attacking French supply convoys in the vicinity of Bel Punar and El-Oghlu as they moved between Aintab and Islahie (Islahiye) toward Marash. News that the first relief column under battalion commander Major Corneloup had been pinned down by hostile forces prompted Dufieux to dispatch additional echelons from Aintab and Islahie and to transfer regional commander General Querette from Aintab to Marash to lead the operation. All companies, withstanding the bitter cold and several raids from ambush, reached Marash by January 17, strengthening the French garrison to more than a thousand men. Because of the weather and billeting limitations, the force was broken down and lodged in schools, churches, and public buildings. General Querette established his headquarters at barracks north of the city near the American missionary compound, where personnel of the American Near East Relief (NER) organization and medical missionaries were assisting the population. Without wireless radio equipment, the French units could keep in touch only by messenger.²⁸

After a French supply convoy was ambushed near El-Oghlu on January 19 and a relief party from Marash was attacked the following day, General Querette summoned the Muslim civil, military, and religious authorities of Marash on January 21 and presented to them evidence of collusion between the partisan

²⁶ Extensive materials on the state of affairs in Marash and elsewhere throughout Cilicia are included in the Archives of the Armenian National Delegation, housed in the Nubarian Library in Paris. See also Archives de l'Armée, 20N/202, dossier 2; FO 371/5044, E1941/3/44, and FO 371/5165, file E262/44 *passim*.

²⁷ Brémond, "La Cilicie," pp. 338-39; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 112-13, 122.

²⁸ Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 78-82; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 122-23; Du Hays, *Le temps des combats*, pp. 239-40.

bands and suspicious elements within the city. He detained several of the notables, dismissing the others with demands for immediate measures to prevent any more hostile acts. As soon as the leaders had departed, however, the Turkish chief of police gave a signal with a pistol shot, and the city reverberated with the sound of rifle fire. The Marash rising had begun. French troops riding with the local gendarmerie or standing guard and unfortunate Armenians who happened to be outdoors at the moment became the first victims of the battle, which was to rage for three weeks.²⁹

The siege separated the French contingents into several isolated groups. The terrified Armenians fled into their churches for protection, as they had done for centuries in times of trouble. Women, children, and the elderly filled the six Apostolic and three Evangelical churches and the large Catholic cathedral, while many of the men took up positions to try to defend their homes and religious sanctuaries. Bombardment of the Turkish positions by French field guns only intensified the conflict within the city, where the insurgents advanced from house to house. The Turks threw kerosene-doused rags on the Armenian homes, burning a path toward the churches. Despite efforts by the Armenian legionnaires and defenders, the churches, one after the other, were put to flame. The hysterical people within tried to escape but were struck by barrages of bullets and driven back into the inferno. The shrieks of the burning victims rose up to the American compound, where sickened missionaries and relief workers looked on helplessly through binoculars. By the end of the siege, only charred bodies and incendiary rubble remained in place of the First, Second, and Third Armenian Evangelical churches, the Apostolic churches of Surb Gevorg (Kevork), Surb Astvatsatsin, and Surb Karasun Mankats, and most of the Armenian quarters.³⁰

²⁹ Mabel E. Elliott, *Beginning Again at Ararat* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1924), pp. 98-114; Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 87-99; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 123-25. See also the secret report of Edgar Pech in Archives de l'Armée, 20N/202, dossier 2, no. 478, March 7, 1920.

³⁰ Materne Muré, *Un épisode de la tragédie arménienne: Le massacre de Marache (février 1920)* (Brussels, 1921), pp. 6-14; *Missionary Herald* 116 (April 1920): 165-66, 185-87, and (May 1920): 212-13; Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 99-142. For a detailed Armenian account, see Hovsep Ter-Vardanian, *Marashi jarde 1920-*

Throughout the siege, the local French command had not been in direct contact with divisional headquarters in Adana. A number of Armenian legionnaires and native Armenians disguised as Muslims tried to pass through enemy lines, but only a few made it through. Not until January 31 did General Dufieux receive first-hand accounts of the critical situation in Marash. He immediately selected Lieutenant Colonel Robert Normand to direct a relief expedition and ordered reconnaissance flights by the first airplane he received from Beirut. The appearance of the plane over Marash gave fresh hope to the Armenians, French, and Americans, while it alarmed the insurgents, who had been unable to dislodge Major Corneloup's companies from the southern quarters commanding the approaches from Aintab and Islahie. On the night of February 7, Normand's expedition fought its way into the city and the next day bombarded the Turkish positions, establishing liaison with Corneloup and then breaking through to Querette's headquarters in the north.³¹

The thanksgiving of the Armenian population was to be short-lived. Claiming to have orders to evacuate the French garrison unless General Querette had the situation fully in hand within forty-eight hours, Normand took it upon himself to order Corneloup's withdrawal from the southern quarters. Though reluctant to relinquish positions that his men had stubbornly held for three weeks, Corneloup finally submitted to Normand's insistent demand. This accomplished, Normand met with Querette to urge a complete evacuation, explaining that General Dufieux had instructed that the security of the troops should be the paramount concern, followed by the humanitarian consideration to protect the Christian and loyal Muslim elements as much as possible.³² When Querette vacillated, Normand insisted that no more troops would arrive, that arms and ammunition would soon be exhausted, and

in ev patmakan hamarot aknark me antsialin vra [The Marash Massacre in 1920 and a Concise Historical Look at the Past] (Jerusalem, 1927). For a Turkish account of the insurrection, see Yaşar Akbıyık, *Milli Mücadelede güney cephesi (Maraş)* [The National Struggle on the Southern Front (Marash)] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990).

³¹ Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 126-29; Du Hays, *Le temps des combats*, p. 243; FO 371/5044, E1803/3/44 enclosure.

³² Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 150-53, 161-62; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 129-32; Du Hays, *Le temps des combats*, pp. 244-45.

that the military situation could not justify risking the loss of the entire garrison for the sake of defending an isolated outpost.

General Querette, reasoning that Corneloup's men had already been withdrawn in the south and that he had already been forced to slaughter many mules and horses for food, acceded to the caveats of his subaltern and began preparations to pull out. Ironically, at the time the decision to evacuate came, the Turks had sent emissaries to seek a cease-fire and terms of submission. Many of the chete bands were already leaving the city. But Querette was not a resolute commander and found it difficult to order his men back to their abandoned positions. Thus, for several hours on the night of February 10, 1920, the French columns marched out of the city to the sound of explosions of their ammunition depots.³³

In order that no attempt be made to hinder their exit from the city, the French commanders tried to keep the evacuation a secret from Turks and Armenians alike. On the final day before departure, however, the news spread rapidly among the Armenians in the American compound and other buildings near the French positions. Thus, several thousand panic-stricken Armenians fled into the night to escape with the retreating French troops, but those who poured out of the Catholic cathedral to catch up with the columns were cut down by Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire. The Armenians of Marash had been abandoned.³⁴

The four to five thousand Armenians who managed to get away soon found that the cup of misfortune continued to run over. During the three-day, 75-mile trek to Islahie, hundreds of them lost the last measure of strength, dropping their infants into the snow and shortly thereafter falling themselves. On the last day of the death march, a raging blizzard whipped the caravan from before dawn until after nightfall, turning hundreds of Armenians into snow-covered mounds. Throughout the night of February 13 and into the next day, some 1,500 refugees straggled into Islahie, frostbitten and forlorn.³⁵

³³ Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 129-32; Sahakyan, *Turk-fransiakan haraberutyunnere*, pp. 152-58; Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 157-62, 191-92.

³⁴ Muré, *Le massacre de Marache*, pp. 15-17; Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 136-38.

³⁵ Muré, *Le massacre de Marache*, pp. 18-20; Brémond, "La Cilicie," p. 340; Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, pp. 186-92. Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, p. 139, gives the number of Christians who perished in the retreat as 3,000. See Dr. Mabel Elliot's

The "Marash Affair" spelled renewed tragedy for the Armenians, momentous victory for the Turkish Nationalists, and an end to any French designs to maintain political control in Cilicia. French casualties included 160 killed, 280 wounded, 170 missing, and 300 severely frostbitten. Even more damaging, those Muslim elements that had initially cooperated with the French now became aloof and began to listen to the message carried by the agents and emissaries of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The role of Colonel Normand in this decisive loss of French prestige stirred deep controversy, as sources close to General Dufieux maintained that there had been no intention to evacuate Marash and that the commanding officer had been genuinely amazed to learn of the withdrawal. What was most disturbing was that the Turks had already shown signs of giving up the siege and seeking accommodation and that the massacre and immolation of thousands of Armenians had occurred under the eyes of an armed force of an Allied nation. Raising even greater suspicion and speculation, Dufieux was given to understand by Gouraud's headquarters in Beirut that Normand's role in the Marash fiasco should be probed no further.³⁶

The Reaction

Even before the French garrison had evacuated Marash, reports of the siege were relayed to Europe by American and Allied representatives. Prominent British relief official Harold Buxton, in Adana at the time, was among the first to telegraph that Marash was burning and Armenians were again being massacred.³⁷ Bits

personal account, *Beginning Again at Ararat*, pp. 115-31. She states (pp. 129-30) that just when they could proceed no farther because of the blizzard, a train whistle was heard from Islahie: "There were some who began trying to run toward it. In the darkness there were screams, groans, calls of those suddenly separated from the mob. The last half-mile, I think, more people dropped and died than in any of the miles we had toiled over. . . . Hundreds of the refugees died in Islahai [sic]. What it must have been to them, the thousands who poured down on the little station to find no shelter and to be helped by no last heroic efforts of exhausted men, I do not want to imagine."

³⁶ Archives de l'Armée, 20N/1088, dossiers 2 and 3, and 20N/202, dossier 2. See also Du Véou, *La passion de la Cilicie*, pp. 138-39, showing that the French (foremost among them the Senegalese) had suffered 1,200 casualties and that 200 officers and men had one to four limbs amputated because of frostbite.

³⁷ FO 371/5041, E32/3/44 enclosure. See also FO 371/5043, E1168/3/44.

and pieces of information came in from a variety of sources thereafter, some of them exaggerating the number of Armenians actually killed but all accurately portraying the seriousness of the situation. American missionaries, relief workers, and consular officials repeatedly appealed for action to safeguard the pitiful remnant of a once proud people. The following extract of a message from American relief official William S. Dodd typified that sentiment:

The chapter of Armenian history that is being enacted in Cilicia now is as tragic and pathetic as the Great Deportation. Returning from that exile and beginning with energy to live once more and to hope once more, they find themselves betrayed, and that by their allies, massacred by their conquered enemy, and stripped barer than they were in 1915. . . . Where can we appeal? Who will listen? Are we to see this tragedy carried out to completion before our very eyes?³⁸

By the latter part of February, newspapers were printing the grisly details of the Marash debacle. Pointed questions were being asked in European legislatures, and protest meetings were taking place in many cities. The British Armenia Committee, headed by Member of Parliament Aneurin Williams, held the Allies responsible, as the massacre had occurred fifteen months after the complete defeat of the Ottoman Empire and under the eyes of Allied troops. The committee demanded swift action to arm the Armenians for self-defense, dispatch reinforcements to prevent a recurrence, and establish a mandatory administration in Cilicia "without any interference or suzerainty of Turkey. . . ."³⁹ Armenian representatives Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian made the rounds to all the Allied delegations in Paris and London, while the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, Archbishop Zaven Eghian, elicited statements of compassion and concern from King George V, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and other prominent

³⁸ Richard G. Hovannisian, "Introduction," Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, p. xxii.

³⁹ On this and similar appeals and petitions, see FO 371/5041-5042, E102/E230/E275/E284/E315/E667/E716/E1048/E1055/3/44, and FO 371/5209-5210, E1703/E4026/1244/44. On the British Armenia Committee, see Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923* (London: Croom, Helm, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 44-57.

figures.⁴⁰

For their part, the French were at first tight-lipped, then gave reassurances about the situation; internally, though, they were stunned. In Constantinople, High Commissioner Defrance made strong representations to the sultan's government, protesting that the incursions were being organized from territory under jurisdiction of the Turkish authorities.⁴¹ On February 16, Foreign Secretary Curzon instructed British High Commissioner John Michael de Robeck, in making public the belabored Allied decision to leave Constantinople within the future Turkish state, to warn at the same time that "unless the massacres of Armenians and the attacks on Allied troops in Asia Minor cease immediately, the peace terms will probably be modified to the detriment of Turkey."⁴²

Such declarations notwithstanding, during the Allied deliberations then taking place in London on completing the draft of the Turkish peace treaty, the French Deputy Foreign Minister Philippe Berthelot signaled a departure in his country's policy regarding Cilicia. When Curzon mentioned the Marash massacres and France's obligation as the mandatory power for Cilicia to provide special protection for the Armenians, Berthelot replied that Mustafa Kemal "was merely playing a game of bluff." Moreover, the situation might be serious if France planned to stay on, but "he wished categorically to state that the French Government did not intend permanently to occupy Cilicia, they intended eventually to withdraw, merely maintaining a certain control."⁴³

On February 17, 1920, Berthelot laid out the French strategy, which was to gain most-favored-nation status in Cilicia but return the region to Turkish suzerainty. It was necessary, he began, to take into account the wishes of the Turkish population. This had already been done in regard to the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor. As to Cilicia, "the French Government were prepared

⁴⁰ Archives of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia (Watertown, Massachusetts), Files 105/4, 118/17, 132/31, 334/4, 422/2; FO 371/5209-5210, E1214/E5483/E5613/1214/44, and FO 371/5041-5042, E357/E710/3/44.

⁴¹ FO 371/5041, E438/E468/E516/3/44; Archives de l'Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, no. 31. See also Söylemezoğlu, *Başımıza gelenler*, pp. 179-82; Kemal, *Speech*, pp. 326-33.

⁴² FO 371/5041, E103/3/44.

⁴³ *British Documents*, vol. 7 (1958), pp. 82-85. In mid-January 1920, Alexandre Millerand had succeeded Georges Clemenceau as prime minister of France.

to make considerable sacrifices, and he would state at once that they did not envisage annexation now or in the future. . . . Further, France would see that Turkey exercised not merely a nominal sovereignty over the province, but she would retain a real sovereignty, subject, of course, always to the general financial and administrative control and the establishment of a native gendarmerie, with foreign instructors, to keep order." Berthelot admitted: "Possibly it might be true to say that France had reached her present decision on account of events which had recently occurred there." Prime Minister Lloyd George responded that the French had come to "a sound conclusion," especially as Muslims outnumbered Christians three to one in Cilicia, but that France should not expect additional concessions elsewhere. Curzon cautioned that the Allies were committed to safeguarding the Armenians of Cilicia and if the French withdrew summarily the Turks would be tempted to make "a clean sweep of all the remainder." Berthelot gave assurances that "the French troops would only be withdrawn from Cilicia after the treaty with Turkey had come into force, and after the guarantees laid down in the treaty had actually been applied."⁴⁴

Protection of the Armenians in Cilicia came up from time to time during the next several days, especially in connection with a proposed tripartite agreement on French, Italian, and British zones of economic priority in Turkey.⁴⁵ Curzon expressed concern that the massacres of Armenians in Cilicia would continue after the French withdrew unless there were some direct guarantees: "It would be impossible to leave the Allies open to the charge that they were taking all they could out of these countries, putting money in their pockets, and leaving the Armenians to be killed." Berthelot reiterated France's commitment to protect the 150,000 Armenians in Cilicia but added that what was needed was "some honest, straightforward formula which could not be interpreted to mean that France intended permanently to retain Cilicia on the pretext of safeguarding the Armenians."⁴⁶

The "Marash Affair" culminated in the decision of the mutually-suspicious Allies to confront the sultan's government with a stern

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 89-94.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 99-102, 128-33, 164-73, 191, 257-62.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 171-72.

warning by a military occupation of several key governmental ministries and other strategic places in Constantinople.⁴⁷ Such measures, however, proved ineffective without the resolve to meet with military force the challenge of Mustafa Kemal's Nationalists in the interior provinces. And in the end, the Allied Powers were to make their peace with the Turkish champion in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Turkish republic, inclusive of Cilicia, which Kemal established in the same year. By that time, the Armenians had been driven from the towns and villages to which they had returned only two or three years earlier—Urfa, Zeitun, Sis, Kars-Bazar, Haruniye, Baghche, Hasanbeyli, Osmaniye, Dort-Yol, Misis, among many others, and eventually even Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin.⁴⁸ The mountainous stronghold of Hajin was besieged for eight months before it fell and its inhabitants massacred in October 1920,⁴⁹ and the long siege and self-defense at Aintab in 1920-21 was to end in the mass evacuation of the Armenian population to Aleppo after it became known that the French (Franklin-Bouillon) had made an accord with the Kemalists to restore Cilicia to Turkish rule and to withdraw all the French garrisons.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 297-306, 358-64, 377-79, 411-23, 453-54, 450-57, and vol. 13 (1963), pp. 9-11, 25-26, 38-40, 43-47; FO 371/5042-5045, File 3/44, February-March 1920; Archives de l'Armée, 20N/168, dossier 1, February-April 1920.

⁴⁸ Sahakyan, *Türk-fransiyakan haraberutyunnere ev Kilikian*, pp. 166-268; Nazaret Gh. Zeytuntsian, *Zeytuni verjin depkere (1919-1921)* [The Recent Events in Zeitun (1919-1921)] (Alexandretta: A. Kassabian, 1922); Vard Mekhak, *Zeytuni nahanje* [The Retreat of Zeitun] (Constantinople, 1922). For contemporary running accounts of the Armenian crisis in Cilicia, see *The Missionary Herald*, vols. 116-118 (1920-1922).

⁴⁹ Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 297-99. For detailed Armenian sources, see M. Sepuh, *Hajeni voghbergutiune, 5 mart 1920-15 hokt. 1920: Vaverakan ev antip teghekutiunner Hajeni pasharumin ev kotoratsin* [The Tragedy of Hajin, March 5-Oct. 15, 1920: Documentary and Unpublished Information on the Siege and Massacre of Hajin] (Aleppo: Ani, 1960); Aram Aspet, *Drvagner Hajno herosamarten ev herosin odiskane* [Episodes from the Heroic Battle of Hajin and the Hero's Odyssey] (Beirut, 1961); Sokrat H. Terzian, *Hajeni utamsia diutsaznamarte* [The Eight-Month Titanic Battle of Hajin] (Athens: Partenon, 1937).

⁵⁰ Walker, *Armenia*, pp. 300-02. For French military accounts, see Maurice Abadie, ... *Opérations au Levant: Le quatre sièges d'Aintab (1920-1921)* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1922); Colonel Charles Joseph Edouard Andréa, *La vie militaire au Levant: Un colonne pendant un an dans le Nord Syrien et en Mesopotamie, mars 1920-mars 1921: Siège d'Ain-Tab* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1923). For detailed

"Marash Affair" gave rise to an irreversible tide that would sweep the Turkish Nationalists to power and cast the Armenians into permanent exile.

Eyewitness Accounts

A comprehensive history of the postwar contest for Cilicia awaits the conscientious labors of meticulous scholars who are able to scrutinize primary sources in several languages and in widely dispersed repositories. Among the relevant sources are eyewitness accounts, which can be as valuable as official dispatches and reports. It is in such accounts especially that the human dimension comes alive, affording insights that are less obvious in formal diplomatic correspondence.

In the case of Marash, the experiences of several of the Americans and Canadians who were hurtled into the midst of the fray have been recorded. American philanthropy administered through Near East Relief (NER), successor organization to the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE), saved the lives of thousands of destitute Armenians after the world war. The food stations and orphanages, the expeditions into the deserts to retrieve Armenian women and children from Muslim tribesmen, the opening of workshops and other rehabilitative establishments, slightly mitigated the bitter disappointments arising from the failure of the United States to ensure the Armenian people a collective future by accepting a protective mandate over the independent Armenian state that was drawn on paper by the Paris Peace Conference. In Cilicia, NER worked among the repatriates for four years and, after the mass Armenian exodus in 1922, attempted to assist the refugee throngs to resettle in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and other Mediterranean lands.

During his initial investigations into the British and United

Armenian accounts, see A. Kesar, *Ayntapi goyamarte* [Aintab's Battle for Survival] (Boston: Hairenik, 1945); Gevorg Papoyan [Kevork Baboyan] "Antepi herosamarte" [The Heroic Battle of Aintab], in Gevorg A. Sarafian, ed., *Patmutiun Antepi Hayots* [History of the Armenians of Aintab], 2 vols. (Los Angeles: Union of the Armenians of Aintab in America, 1953), vol. 2, pp. 7-274; Sargis Laleyan, ed., *Hushamatian nvirvats Atur H. Levoniani* [Memorial Volume Dedicated to Adour H. Levonian] (Beirut: Atlas, 1967).

States archives, this author came across the diary of C.F.H. Crathern, secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, who was then in Marash to establish a local branch of the YMCA. His diary entries from January 21 to February 14, 1920, capture the poignancy of the battle for Marash and especially the tragic drama in which the Armenians were caught up from the beginning of the Nationalist insurgency to the French withdrawal and Armenian flight.⁵¹ The diary entries, which this author first published as an appendix to Stanley E. Kerr's *The Lions of Marash*, are reproduced here as a fitting conclusion to the story of the "Marash Affair."⁵²

⁵¹ FO 371/5044, E1784/3/44. The transcription of the diary was done in the British spelling style.

⁵² See Kerr, *Lions of Marash*, Appendix B. Words in brackets were not in the original diary and are added here for further identification or clarification.

APPENDIX

*Extract from the Diary of YMCA
Secretary Crathern
concerning the Siege and War in
Marash, January 20 to February 11, 1920.*

SECRETARY CRATHERN had been in Marash for the purpose of organising a Y.M.C.A. On the 20th January he attempted to return to Aintab in an A.C.R.N.E. auto, with Paul Snyder as chauffeur and Miss Schultz and Lieutenant Cزونery of the French army and three Armenians as passengers. On reaching the hill leading to the summit of the mountain we ran into a pitched battle between the Algerian [French army] cavalry and Turkish bandits. We deemed it advisable to turn back, and on doing so a hundred or more shots were fired at us by the bandits on the mountain. Several bullets penetrated the car and one hit and splintered the cross-section of the steering wheel, fragments of which flew into the faces of the chauffeur and Secretary Crathern. Mr. Crathern waved an American flag from the car, hoping that the firing would cease, but it had no effect on the Turks. By a miracle the car escaped, being negotiated down the hill at 40 miles an hour which was the only thing that saved the party. We returned to Marash without further incident and reported the matter to the General Staff.

January 21

On the 21st January Secretary Crathern sent the following telegram to [U.S.] Consul [Jesse B.] Jackson at Aleppo, Admiral [U.S. High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Mark L.] Bristol, of Constantinople:

“American flag fired on repeatedly and the lives of American

citizens threatened and imperilled in Marash and Aintab.

Inform Major [Davis G.] Arnold of the Relief Commission and Y.M.C.A. Headquarters—C.F.H. Crathern, Secretary.”

These telegrams were O.K'd by General Querette, of the French Staff, and I was assured by Turkish and French officials at the telegraph office that the telegram would be sent without fail within half-an-hour. After sending this telegram I walked through the city with Mr. [NER worker Stanley] Kerr and an interpreter. The bazaars and the shops were all closed and the Turks were getting together in little groups all over the city; only a few Armenians were to be seen in the thoroughfares. About 1 o'clock, while at the dinner table, we heard the crash of guns, and knew that the conflict that had been threatening so long had now broken out. Before the first shot was fired I found, on reaching the missionary compound, a company of Turkish officials including the Mutessarif [district governor], a Turkish hodja [Muslim cleric] and other notables. These, I understood from Mr. Lyman [American missionary Reverend James K. Lyman], had come to interview me for a purpose which I did not learn. As I found later that they had been detained by the French officials and placed under arrest. This, I presume, was the cause of the first shot being fired by the Turks. The French commandant had informed us earlier in the day that they had determined to strike and to strike hard.

After the first shot was fired we ran to the front balcony where we had a commanding view of the whole city. There was quite a long cannonading and many of the houses of the city were turned into small forts from which the sound of shooting would issue every few minutes, answered by the machine-guns of the French. The Armenians were very much alarmed and are in fear of their lives. Hundreds of the poor have been caught in one of our compounds where they came to receive old clothes, and will have to stay all night as it will be unsafe for them to go home. The fighting and firing have been going on all the afternoon and now it is nearly midnight and there is no cessation. A French sentinel guarding the entrance to the American hospital was shot dead and another wounded. Bullets also passed through two of the nurses' rooms and wounded an Armenian girl. What the morning will bring forth we do not know. I fear that the worst is not over.

January 22

We were awakened this morning by the boom of guns, and saw quite early the flash of exploding shells. The Turks are firing from a number of houses, and as they are using smokeless powder it is impossible to see where the bullets come from. The French soldiers have suffered seriously, and many of them, we hear, are now lying dead and wounded in the streets, and their companions are unable to render them any assistance until night because of the danger arising from the sharp-shooters. The American hospital has again been attacked, and doctors and nurses have had very narrow escapes. The mission buildings have as yet escaped damage, and we do not anticipate any assault as the Turks are not prepared for aggressive warfare. The French general with his staff officers was on our balcony this afternoon to sight approaching Turks who were coming over the mountains on their way to the city. The general gave orders for a gun to be fired with sixty-five mm. shells, which soon scattered them in all directions.

January 23

The battle is still on, but there is no way of getting now into or out of the city. Everything is at a standstill. To-day we have been watching the bombarding of the city by the French. In some sections it is very severe, and created great consternation. It gave many opportunities for looting and pillage, and I fear, massacre. Through our glasses we could see Armenians escaping from their houses and fleeing before the Turks, who were shooting them down like jack-rabbits. Other Turks were hiding in the fields behind rocks, trees and manure heaps, and shooting at those who had escaped the Turks in the city. It was pitiful to see them throw up their hands and scream, while attempting to escape. We watched them fleeing over the hills until they reached our compound, some dropping wounded by the way, and others staggering into the mission grounds with wild eyes and purple faces, telling of an awful massacre just beginning.

January 24

This is the fourth day of the battle of Marash, and every day becomes more pathetic and tragic as time wears on. This morning we held a consultation and decided to interview the French

general to learn the plan of campaign and to lay before him some facts that had come to our knowledge regarding the massacre of the Armenians in the Cuimed [Kumpet] quarter of Marash. This was the region from which he had seen the Armenians running for their lives across the fields. In order to be fortified with the actual facts, as coming from the mouths of eye-witnesses, we interviewed the people who had escaped this massacre. They told most harrowing stories. One woman saw seven killed before her eyes. Mothers had children taken out of their arms and ripped up with knives. One man said two hundred perished in one street. The shrieks of the tortured we could hear a mile across the ravine, which they had to cross to reach our compound. Others gave similar accounts of awful experiences. We laid these facts before the general and his staff, who listened very respectfully, and said the situation was very grave, and that they would take strenuous efforts to cope with it. Wounded soldiers are being brought in to our hospital and several operations have been performed. Yesterday the Mutessarif was released from French custody for the purpose of interviewing the leaders and bringing about a cessation of hostilities. He went back to the Government building under the protection of a white flag with an ultimatum from the general that if the Turks did not surrender in twenty-four hours he would bombard the city.

To-day the Mutessarif telephones to headquarters that it was impossible for him to prevail with the leaders to cease operations, as he had no control over them, and was even in danger of his own life. At 3 o'clock, when the time of the ultimatum had expired, we heard the booms of guns, and knew that the bombardment of the city had commenced. The guns were kept busy for two hours. At 5 o'clock the colonel came to the house and said they had decided to burn certain sections of the city from which the Turks were sniping Armenians and soldiers whenever they appeared. At night the city is in total darkness.

Whenever we go from one compound to another we have to creep under the walls in order to escape shot and shell. There is the most intense excitement every minute of the day, and every compound is thronged with frightened refugees who have escaped during the night, and are alarmed lest their people, whom they have left behind should become the victims of massacre, or fire, or starvation. Women are giving premature birth to children, and

women are going crazy with fear. The A.C.R.N.E. are feeding nearly 2,000 orphans and refugees, and with only a few days' supply of bread the problem is a grave one. To-day we raised the American flag, but no sooner had we raised it to the mast than the salute of a dozen guns sent us scampering to cover. I have just timed by my wrist-watch thirty-three shots in one minute. The machine-guns are picking away like so many giant woodpeckers, and the sharp crack of the rifle is continuous. Last night five Armenian soldiers were sent out by the French disguised as Turkish gendarmes to reach the nearest telegraph station in Ishahie, 75 miles away. Each was the bearer of a long telegram in cipher from the general asking that supplies and reinforcements be sent immediately. Whether they will reach their destination or not we do not know. It is risky business, as the whole country is in a flame of revolt. How soon the issue will be decided it is hard to determine. The capture of the last two caravans of munitions and foodstuffs by bandits between Marash and Aintab make that way of escape or relief impossible. But while the days are exciting the nights are increasingly so. For while the great guns are booming, soldiers are creeping stealthily forth with benzine torches and hand-grenades to set fire to different parts of the city. It is sometimes like Dante's *Inferno*. I have had to move my bed back into a safer quarter of the room, as a bullet came through the window into the hallway and nearly passed through the door.

January 25

The situation here is unique. We are besieged by an invisible army. There are few enemy soldiers in sight, and these are seen only through our glasses, running for cover, or hurrying out of their trenches, or stealing over the mountains in little groups to reach the city. We have not been out of our own compounds for seven days, and even behind our own walls we are not safe against attack. The French have no wireless, no aeroplanes, no telegraph, no armoured cars, and, to make the situation worse, neither food nor ammunition for an extended siege. They have to conserve their supplies, not knowing how long the siege may last or whether the rest of Turkey is in the same state of war or not. They are doing all they can under the circumstances, but with the small force of troops under their command they cannot

make any attack on the city with the certainty of making it surrender. Hundreds of Armenians are trying to reach our compounds from many parts of the city, but are failing in the attempt, and the light of the fires that the Turks are making in Armenian quarters render escape impossible, and those who flee from smoke and flames fall victims to the sword or the axe. News came to-day that scores of women and children huddled in one house were butchered with knives and hatchets after the men had been taken out and shot. They surrendered on the promise of protection, but were cruelly betrayed. To-day in one of our orphanages a woman was killed while standing in the doorway, and others were shot and wounded in the college compound.

January 26

We are still in the throes of most terrible war that involves not only the armed forces of the opposing armies, but also the unfortunate Armenians who are the victims of the most hellish cruelty imaginable. The crescent moon, the cold-blooded symbol of Moslem fanaticism, is rising tonight on a city in whose streets to-day have been enacted tragedies that ought to stagger humanity, and send a shudder of protest to the Throne of God. I have read much, and heard more, of the atrocities the Armenians have suffered in the past, but I never expected to witness first hand the barbarities that are a disgrace to civilisation and a stain on the escutcheons of the Great Powers that can permit such a Government to exist. And yet what I have seen and heard during the last two days is but a small part of the horrors that are registered for ever upon the brains of those who have escaped bleeding and wounded, to tell their tale upon the operation table in the hospital, or to babble in an incoherent way from their sick beds of the inferno from which they have escaped. Some of the most revolting stories ever heard have been told us to-day by those who have come limping into our compounds from different parts of the city. Little girls, 8 and 10 years old, and wrinkled women of 70 years were agonising with pain from dum-dum bullet wounds which tore great pieces of flesh from arms and legs, while soldiers have had to have limbs amputated or to pay the supreme sacrifice. Children have been brought to the hospital with their brains oozing from jagged holes in the head, and elderly people while sitting in their own homes have received shots which have

shattered both mind and body.

January 27

This morning one of the native helpers of the A.C.R.N.E. came to tell us of his escape. He had been waiting for several days for a favourable opportunity to flee. It came about 3 o'clock this morning. He tells us that the Turks are killing hundreds of people in the city, and that they are not content with using such weapons as shot and shell, but resort to the brutal use of the axe and knife. At this very moment, there is in our own house a young woman who tells us that with a hundred other persons in a cellar she prayed for five days and nights for help, but no help came. Then the Turks asked them to surrender, promising to give them protection if they would. Being desperate, they threw themselves on the mercy of the enemy. The men were told to come out of the house and her own husband was the first to leave. He was shot immediately in the doorway by one of their own Turkish neighbours whom she knew, and who was a gendarme in the service of the Government. After the men had been taken out there was a scene of indescribable horror as the Turks came in with axes and knives and began their murderous work. In the general mêlée she with one of her children escaped. One child was killed. Two young women teachers from the college were killed in this way. Another escaped and stood in water for eight hours hoping to elude the Turks, but in a fatal moment she ran for her life and was killed by a bullet. The Turks have sent an ultimatum to the French demanding their surrender, or they will attack them to-morrow morning at 4 o'clock. The French hope they will.

January 28

Rumours are flying wild and fast. This morning the startling news was spread abroad that Captain Fontaine [commander of Armenian legionnaires] and 100 men coming to the relief of Marash had been killed and only one man escaped. We learn this evening that he is still fighting his way to the city, and that a supply train of wagons was captured in the morning and many of the convoy killed. We had a pitiful case this morning in the hospital. It was the Rev. [Asadour] Solakian's wife, pastor of the third [Evangelical] church. When she reached the hospital she was

suffering and bleeding from three bullet and three dagger or knife wounds, while a child of 18 months had been taken from her breast and slain with a knife, and an older girl killed with an axe. To add to the sorrow of it the woman was pregnant and had a miscarriage as soon as she reached the hospital. The poor woman is lying in a precarious condition and she will not recover. Several new cases came in to-day and we are troubled to find room for them. The crowded compounds are also a grave problem. In one of them we have over a thousand refugees and we can give them but one meal a day, as the food supply is nearly exhausted. Many are poorly clad and many are weak. Several soldiers are going out to-night to try to take into one of the compounds a thousand Armenians who are finding refuge in a church and fear that the Turks will set fire to it.

January 29

It is nearly midnight and I have just come in from a service of sorrow. The pastor's wife of whom I wrote you yesterday, died to-day and was laid to rest in the seminary compound. This afternoon we had a conference of all American workers to decide what to do in case of emergency. We shall all gather in the college compound and await the final issue. What that will be we do not know. Graves are multiplying in our midst and tales of horror come to us nightly from those who escape from house or cellar. The soldiers who went last night to rescue a thousand Armenians were not able to pass the Turkish trenches. Another orphanage was attacked, but the assault was not successful. Several soldiers came down from the mountains to-day with frozen hands and feet, some of which must be amputated.

January 30

As yet no news of relief from the French authorities. Yesterday was rather quiet from the military point of view. There was only a little cannonading and only a few soldiers killed and wounded. The uncertainty of the situation is a great strain on the nerves of the ladies of our party, but they are brave and cheerful and busy all day ministering to the needs of the unfortunate. Dr. and Mrs. Wilson [NER director in Marash, Dr. Marion C. Wilson] have moved over to the college compound to live as they think it a little safer there in case of attack. They invited me to go with

them, but I feel there is no immediate danger and prefer to wait a few days to watch developments. We have all decided to hang together rather than take our chances on hanging separately.

January 31

War still holds on and no relief in sight. Men, women, and children, about nine of them, were shot in the college grounds to-day and some of them quite seriously wounded. Fortunately, we have plenty of wheat now, and by keeping the women grinding from sunrise to sunset we can feed the people for quite a while. We are obliged to keep the people under cover as walking in the open is too dangerous, and our hospitals are already full.

February 1

The weather has been very cold and we have had several cases of severe frost-bite among the soldiers. More children have been shot in the orphanages. The refugees are much alarmed at the success of the Turks. Several houses have been burned in the city. The hospital still continues to be attacked.

February 2

The war is coming a little closer, for to-day a shell fell on the hospital roof and burst in the attic just above the floor where we had a great many patients. The rifle shots have also been a little more personal as one plunged into a wall a few feet ahead of me, and the second hit a tree as I was creeping along a wall to my room. The Turks tried to set the Bartell [Beitel] orphanage on fire to-day, and the French retaliated by burning the would-be incendiaries' houses. There was considerable bombarding to-day but not many wounded. There is no news of reinforcements and we fear that other cities and towns may be besieged as we are and help may not reach us for some time. Last night we sent a message to the A.C.R.N.E. and to have it telegraphed to Adana and Constantinople. It will probably be seven days before it can reach its destination.

February 3

I suppose no one in the outside world realises the seriousness of our situation or surely an aeroplane from Beirut would drop a message of cheer. This is the telegraph that we sent to Consul

Jackson to Adana and Constantinople:

"Situation in Marash extremely desperate, reign of terror in city since the 21st January, hundreds of men, women, and children massacred daily no power to stop it as French are on the defensive forces, ammunition and food insufficient. Americans have little hope in case French are overpowered, no assurance of help as large forces of bandits bar all roads. Leave nothing undone to relieve situation as lives of all Christians are seriously threatened, our auto and flag fired on repeatedly 20th January our institutions under fire and many orphans and refugees wounded on American property."

Bullets still continue to enter American buildings. We have all had very narrow escapes. The French horses and mules are slowly starving and they will have to kill them and feed them to the hungry multitudes. The French are living in hope that help will come soon.

February 4

This has been a tragic day. New stories of fresh massacres reached us this morning. In one case nearly 200 surrendered to the Turks under promise of protection, but nearly all of them were butchered. One man who escaped by stabbing a Turk told this gruesome story. Deep pits were dug, and men tied in bunches of three and led to the edge of it, and then shot and dumped into it dead or alive. One young girl of 19 was shot in the abdomen while getting a bit of wood. No news yet of help but we shall not give up. We are resolved to stay here at all hazards. God help the Armenians if the Americans leave them, and God help us all if the French leave.

February 5

This morning, Dr. Wilson and Reverend Lyman and I, interviewed the French General and his Staff. Word reached us that Turks were encroaching on Armenian homes and might soon attack the hospital. While we were on our way to headquarters the Turkish officials, who were prisoners in the buildings, asked to see us. The General gave permission, and we had an interview with them. They pleaded with us as Americans to persuade the French officers to stop the war. They promised that if they

were released that they would do all they could to bring the Turks to terms. The General would not release them. I proposed that they should write a letter to the Mutessarif and ask him to persuade the leaders to request a conference. This evening the letter from the Turks came and will be sent as soon as possible to the Turkish Government. The French to-day have decided to kill the horses and mules, as there is no food for them. We had a mule roast to-day and we like it fine. We like it better than horse-meat. A fierce bombardment took place this evening. A perfect hailstorm of bullets rained through our compound. A young woman in the basement of the house was mortally wounded. This has brought the war to our very doors.

February 6

This is the eighth day of the siege of Marash, and this morning we had a joyful surprise. An aeroplane flew over the city and dropped several messages. Unfortunately the wind was very high and carried the messages into the Turkish part of the city, but we know now that help is near and that we are not forgotten. More victims for the operating table and more graves in the cemetery. This afternoon we had another glimpse of an aeroplane, and the French headquarters sent up signals so that they might know where to land if they wished. Everybody is elated to think that communication with the outside world has again been established. We had an answer to-day from the Mutessarif, in reply to our letter which accompanied the communication sent by the Turkish officials. He regretted that he could do nothing without consulting the commander of the forces, but appreciated our interest and thanked us for our kind offer of mediation. I hope help will come before all the Armenians have to pay the awful price of this needless war.

February 7

At last reinforcements are in sight and are already fighting their way into the city. The guns in the plain are shelling the hills over which the scouts expect to reach the barracks. We heard to-day that all the girls in the rescue home [for Armenian girls rescued from Muslim households] have been killed. There were about eighty of them. To add to the horror of the crime the Turks this afternoon set fire to the building and we had the gruesome

necessity to witness the scene without being able to lift a hand to save them. The first church is also on fire.

February 8

The French troops are in the valley and their guns are shelling the hills, but it may be some days yet before they can encircle the city and close in on the enemy. The wounded continue to come, and new deaths take place daily. This afternoon we spent with the French General and his Staff, in the upper storey of the college building, watching the battle in the plain and the attempt of the French relieving troops to make connection with the soldiers in the barracks. This they did later in the day. In the evening we had a thanksgiving service in the college.

February 9

General Querette informed us to-day that he has received orders to evacuate the city at midnight on the 9th. This news caused alarm all through the compounds. Everybody is terribly excited. Women and children are crazed with fear. We have urged him to delay their departure, as the Turks are on the point of surrender. He said his orders were imperative, but he would try to secure a delay of twenty-four hours. If they evacuate the city we are not sure what treatment we will receive at the hands of the Turks. We shall remain, however, at our posts of duty, to do what we can to shield the Armenians and protect American interests. We hope for the best but fear the worst. Our hope is in God. We trust Him where we cannot trace Him, and believe that in some divine way our lives will be spared, but if not, God be with you all until we meet again. I thank my God upon every remembrance of you.

February 10

The French General, in response to our earnest entreaties, has granted a delay of twenty-four hours before leaving the city. We are hoping to bring about an understanding with the Turks that will prevent further massacres. The French took most of their wounded out of the city last night, but left twenty in the emergency hospital. The Armenians in the compounds are frantic and desperate. They are determined to leave the city with the French, as they fear massacre if they remain. The scenes are indescribably

pathetic and tragic. Our greatest concern is for Miss [Frances] Buckley, in Bathshalon [director of Beit-Shalom] Orphanage. We fear the Armenians in other compounds have not been notified of the French withdrawal. We have been fitting out the refugees for the journey, giving them food and clothes to the extent of our supplies. Many of the elder orphan boys and girls will leave with the exiles. Dr. and Mrs. Wilson will remain and all the missionaries. Dr. [NER physician Mabel E.] Elliott, [NER nurses] Miss [Helen] Schultz, Miss [Mabel] Powers, and Miss Doherty will leave with the troops. I had decided to stay but as two or three thousand are going without a shepherd Dr. Wilson thinks I had better go to take charge of them and find for them food and shelter at their destination. It is a long hard trek of nearly 75 miles through mountain and plain, and I fear many of them will not be equal to it. It is winter and God help them if the weather should be severe. We are trying to arrange terms of peace, and if the French forces would remain only a few more days in the city I believe the Turks would lift their hands in abject surrender. We have just had an interview with Dr. Moustafa, the leader of the Turkish forces, and he has agreed to call the notables of the city together to-morrow, for the purpose of considering terms of surrender. But the fact is he is unaware of the positive withdrawal of the French troops to-night. The troops and refugees left the city about the hours of 6 and 9. The French General and his Staff left about 10:30. I accompanied them. It was a bitterly cold night. The city was in flames. Guns were booming from the hills covering our retreat. After three or four hours we arrived at the camp on the plain, and at 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning the long column moved out of Marash on its three days' journey to Islahiyeh.

February 11

As the column moved away from the city it was a blaze of splendour. The great barracks just evacuated by the French was on fire, silhouetted against the sky. Through the long moonlight night the column marched untill noon, when it reached the village of Euloglou [El-Oghlu] and rested for the remainder of the day.

February 12

At 6 o'clock a.m. the column started on its long march to Bell Pounar. The weather was severely cold and many of the weak ones dropped by the wayside to freeze or to starve. At noon the column rested for two hours and reached Bell Pounar about 5 p.m. Turkish villages were burnt by the soldiers after the column has passed through. There were very meagre accommodations in the village, and multitudes were encamped in the open to suffer seriously from hunger and exposure.

February 13

During the night a snowstorm raged and at 6 o'clock the column prepared to move forward while it was yet dark. The snowstorm increased during the early morning hours to a blizzard and continued all through the long dreary march. From twelve to eighteen hours the soldiers and civilians plodded their way through the storm and snow-drifts. All along the line the weak and the infirm dropped out from sheer exhaustion. It is estimated that before the column reached Islayieh more than a thousand of the refugees had perished in the snow, besides many of the soldiers. It was a tragic ending of a tragic exodus.

February 14

We did our best to care for the refugees in Islahiyeh. Many died after reaching their destination. No accommodations were available in the village and very little food. I interviewed the Turkish Governor and the French Commandant, and secured their cooperation in doing something for the refugees. A bakery was secured to furnish bread and a mill to grind flour. I left with the French wounded on the evening train for Adana to confer with Dr. [William S.] Dodd of the A.C.R.N.E. and Dr. [W. Nesbitt] Chambers of the American Mission, to see what could be done to help these unfortunates in their distress. Milk and blankets were despatched immediately and further supplies prepared to meet the urgent necessity of the situation. All the American forces in the city have put themselves at the service of these stranded Armenians. It is hoped that eventually they will be brought to Adana, where the pastors of the city are preparing to receive them and house them in their churches and other institutions in the city. I am now trying to return to my station at Aintab by way of Beirut


and Aleppo. Dr. Chambers, who is on his way to Constantinople to plead the cause of the Armenians before the representatives of the *Entente* [Allied] Powers, will carry this message with him as a record of the events that transpired in Marash during those crucial weeks.



Marash: Armenian Central School, Established 1880



Marash: Armenian Catholic Mesrobian School, 1904



Marash: Evangelical Academy, 1893



Marash: Ebenezer Orphanage



Marash Deportees, 1915: Sisters-in-Law Ovsanna Janbazian with Son Noubar and Arshalouis Hassessian with Daughter Azniv



Marash: American Missionary Compound



Marash: Missionary and Near East Relief Personnel, 1919-20



Marash in Flames, February 1920



Marash: Armenian Refugees, 1920